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My main interest in the philosophy of mind is to understand the structure of our conscious mental eposides that allow us to relate to objects in our direct environment. At different occasions I have tried to formulate arguments to show that the complex mental life of an adult human being is not "just given" at birth, but evolves and in is shaped by influences from the social and physical environment.
I have always tried to draw on results from the phenomenological and the analytical traditions to formulate these arguments: at several moments I could note that in the philosophy of mind, the methodological stance plays a decisive role: those who aim at giving a phenomenological description of conscious acts will likely pay attention to the phenomenal qualities of lived experience, philosophers who focus on the epistemic role of perception will likely emphasize the intrinsic normative dimension of the content of our conscious episodes, and philosophers who want to understand the place of mind in a physical world will likely downplay both of these aspects in favour of a reductionist position. As a consequence, I think, doing philosophy of mind always needs to include an open-minded reflection on the methodological stance one is about to take.
Consciousness and Self
[BOOK] The Constitution of Consciousness
A Study in Analytic Phenomenology [OPEN ACCESS]
New York: Routledge.
Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution
in: Synthese 137/3 (2003), pp. 345-68.
Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Felix Kaufmann
in: The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook X/2002), ed. by F. Stadler, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003, pp. 151-61.
The Transition from Causes to Norms
Wittgenstein on Training
in: Grazer philosophische Studien 71 (2006), pp. 205-25.
Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity: Dimensions of the Social Self
in: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2018).
Das Prinzip des nomologischen Charakters der Kausalität -- ein weiteres Dogma des Empirismus?
in: Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen, ed. by W. Hogrebe, Bonn: Sinclair Press, 2002, pp. 481-92.
Philosophy of Perception
Die Struktur des Wahrnehmungserlebnisses im Spannungsfeld zwischen phänomenologischen und epistemischen Aspekten
in: XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie , 11. - 15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
Nicht-begrifflicher Gehalt und der Mythos des Gegebenen
in: Ausgewählte Sektionsbeiträge der GAP 6, ed. by S. Walter and H. Bohse, Paderborn: mentis, 2008.
Von der Tatsache zur Proposition
Bemerkungen zu McDowells Theorie der Wahrnehmung
in: Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongresses der ÖGP, ed. by O. Neumaier, C. Sedmak, and M. Zichy, Frankfurt: ontos, 2005, pp. 296-302.
Kausale Theorien der Wahrnehmung und holistischer Hintergrund
in: Argument und Analyse, ed. by A. Beckermann and C. Niemtz Paderborn: mentis, 2002, pp. 384-94.
The World as We See It
A Late-Wittgensteinian Argument for Direct Realism
in: Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years, ed. by
R. Haller and K. Puhl, Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001, pp. 326-31.
reductionism and Neuro-philosophy
Philosophy of Mind between Reduction, Elimination, and Enrichment
in: New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, ed. by M. D'Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia, London: College Publications, 2010, pp. 481-91.
Die Beschreibung mentaler Phänomene
Zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften
in: Gehirne und Personen, ed. by M. Fürst, W. Gombocz and C. Hiebaum, Frankfurt: ontos, 2008, pp. 99-111.
Lebensweltliche und naturwissenschaftliche Ansätze in der Philosophie des Geistes
Wilfrid Sellars' Utopie eines synoptischen Blicks
in: Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft. XXI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, 2008.
Schön ist, was Neuronen im prämotorischen Kortex stimuliert? Für eine Grenzziehung zwischen Ästhetik und Neurophysiologie
in: Crossing Borders. Grenzen (über)denken. Beiträge zum 9. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Wien, hg. von Alfred Dunshirn, Elisabeth Nemeth, Gerhard Unterthurner, 2012.
On the History of Psychology
Johann Friedrich Herbart on Mind
(co-authored with Christoph Landerer)
in: Philosophy of Mind in the 19th Century (The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 5), Ed. by Sandra Lapointe, London/New York: Routledge, 2018, pp. 60-76.
Mathematics, Experience, and Laboratories. Herbart's and Brentano's Role in the Raise of Scientific Psychology
(co-authored with Christoph Landerer)
in: History of the Human Sciences 23/3 (2010), pp. 72-94.
Franz Brentano
in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. N. Zalta. © 2002, 2006, 2010.
Die Entwicklung von Brentanos Theorie des Zeitbewusstseins
in: Brentano Studien 10 (2002/03), pp. 193-220.
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