

WITTGENSTEIN – POETRY AND LITERATURE

Rudolf Haller

University of Graz

I.

In this paper I intend to present Wittgenstein from two perspectives, which in a certain sense are not in harmony. We may think of the two selected models or types which constitute the same character thus: one is the analytic *philosopher* partly formed by a strange mixture of Frege and Russell with Schopenhauer, Tolstoi, and Dostoevskii. The other is the *artist*, whose aim is the perfection of forms, be they of construction, furniture, poetry, or philosophical texts. The unity of these artificially distinguished characters is a precondition for an interpretation of Wittgenstein's general attitudes and prejudices in regard to art, music and literature, and, in general, form and style. Wittgenstein finds the first application of the analytic method or style in logic, in the language of signs which he had studied with Frege and Russell. We know about these early steps by way of Wittgenstein's notes written in 1913, dictated to George E. Moore during his stay in Norway in April 1914, and especially from his diaries of the First World War dating from August 1914 to January 1917.

II.

In taking up this topic I am well aware that other philosophers have long wrestled with the very same difficult and problematic questions for a long time and have achieved remarkable results. I am especially thinking of Georg Henrik von Wright's essay "Wittgenstein and His Time" and his talk at the symposium in honor of Jaakko Hintikka in Helsinki in 1989, "Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century."¹ The first part of Wright's study provides an overview of the general background of modernity from the turn of the century to the 1930s: modernity viewed as the legacy of the Age of Enlightenment, the achievement of the French Revolution, the rise of science and industry, and the desire to liberate humankind, whatever this means. One outcome of this process was the modernisation of our ways of life: mobility, urbanisation, and the total change from an agricultural to an industrial society along with democratisation. We can observe these developments in many countries, especially in the USA and in many parts of Europe, and in a few other countries,

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like Japan, who are now in competition with old Europe and the USA. As might be expected, and as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other authors had predicted and demonstrated in their works, these changes were paralleled by other social, political, and economic revolutions. Wright rightly underlines that “in origin it was an optimistic mood,” which impregnated the leading ideas and the hope for steady progress in the liberation of humanity. And these general expectations reflected also one of the main ideas of the nineteenth century: the *idea of evolution* not only in nature, as we find it in Darwin and Mach, but also if we think of Hegel, Comte, or Spencer in the history of ideas and societies – as, for instance, von Hayek has pointed out in his masterpiece *The Counterrevolution of Science*.²

While the optimistic idea of steady progress was boosted for some time by the rapid growth of science and industry, it cannot be ignored that during the very same period an equally strong counter-movement arose. Against the rationalistic system of Hegel there was Kierkegaard’s religious critique, and later the much more forceful attack on the leading ideologies of the nineteenth century advanced by Nietzsche. All of the metaphysical comfort of great philosophy had to be destroyed, relieved from the search and need for metaphysical substitutes. Not only Christian morality was questioned: the entire ethos of the modern time was something to be overturned. But Nietzsche’s work was not merely destructive; he was not simply the *Alles-Zermalmer*, he was not playing with incitement, but was concerned much more basically with a new kind of honest morality.

Another movement countering the superficial optimism of the “progressists” came from Russia with the writings of Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. Like Nietzsche, who placed Dostoevskii on the same level as Schopenhauer, de Vigny, Leopardi, and Pascal,³ Wittgenstein had an enthusiasm for Dostoevskii’s “romantic pessimism.” Although the writing as well as the life of Tolstoi had a deep impact on Wittgenstein, this did not diminish the high esteem in which he held Dostoevskii and especially the *Karamasov*.⁴ But, even if it were true that Wittgenstein preferred Dostoevskii, and I think it is, his own way of life and his decision at the end of the war to free himself of his inheritance and wealth were deeply influenced and motivated by Tolstoian ideas. Biographical publications and documents produced by Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils have provided a wealth of data and interpretation both in respect of his life and his philosophical remarks. We may think of the biographies by McGuinness and Monk, the recollections of his friends and students, and the prodigious literature based on these accounts.

If we direct our interest to Wittgenstein’s relation to and understanding of literature, we have to distinguish between different kinds of literature (poetic, philosophical, scientific, or religious texts, etc.). What I intend to do is to try to understand a little better the fact that Wittgenstein was not only a philosopher – one of the two or three most important philosophers of the twentieth century – but that he was many-sided in a deep sense. Even in philosophy he was not merely a creative logician: he was also a revolutionary defender of ordinary language and its use in philosophy; he was the first of a long line able to escape the enduring scholastic

school as well as the habit of compiling compendia; but he also nevertheless accepted the power and value of tradition. What I am interested in is not so much Wittgenstein's philosophical texts and their interpretation, but his understanding of literary works of the past and especially of his own time.

After the period of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*, which after all was neither a “*Abhandlung*” nor a “*Tractatus*” in the usual style, he decided to write *remarks*. Some of them are so concentrated and perfect in form and content that they could be mistaken for aphorisms. Actually he himself was aware of this danger, which is similar to that of unintentionally turning a straightforward sentence into a rhyme. For Wittgenstein, style was not only an aesthetic category; it was first and foremost a moral one. “Writing in the right style,” he says, “is setting the carriage straight on the rails.”⁵ Unsurprisingly, from time to time he criticises his own style, e.g.: “My style is like bad musical composition.”⁶ Style has to do with one's self; it is a way of reacting to the world and to ourselves. And this, very often, has to do with religion. I personally think that one of the marks of Wittgenstein's character was undeniably his strong religiosity (which he separated from his philosophy as far as possible) and steady search for God's protection. If we read the so-called *Secret Diaries*, we find again and again the cry to God for help, even in the form of a prayer, as on April 7, 1916: “Gott helfe mir. Ich bin ein armer unglücklicher Mensch. Gott erhöre mich und schenke mir den Frieden! Amen.”⁷ (“Help me God. I am a miserable, wretched human being. Hear me, God, and grant me peace! Amen.”)

We, who have read and studied the *Tractatus* (completed at the end of the First World War in 1918) and the *Philosophical Investigations* (the first part of which was finished at the end of the Second World War in 1945, which is also the date of his preface to his second book), normally see his work as the most important contribution, first, to the philosophy of Logical Empiricism in the 1920s and 1930s, and then to the broader wave of analytic philosophy arising after World War II.

It is well known that for a time after the First World War Wittgenstein contemplated becoming a monk. However, Russell was right: it was “an idea, not an intention.”⁸ But even an idea may point to an important fact, namely that Wittgenstein's genuine perspective was beyond modernity also in regard to religious beliefs. In 1919 Russell states that “[I] was astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic,” and he refers to Wittgenstein's interest in Kierkegaard, Angelus Silesius, and Tolstoi's writing on the Gospels. Many of the later remarks in his diaries written in the thirties signify Wittgenstein's steady concern with religion. Since he does not understand the real Christian belief (“Den eigentlichen *Christenglauben* – nicht den *Glauben* – verstehe ich noch gar nicht”),⁹ he is struggling constantly with his inescapable desire to reach certainty: “Die Leiden des Geistes loswerden, das heißt die Religion los werden.”¹⁰ (“To get rid of the pain of mind means to get rid of religion.”)

Almost all remarks are in one way or another connected to the problem of language and the problem of our life – and both problems relate to the question of faith: “Gott laß mich fromm sein aber *nicht* überspannt”¹¹ (“God, let me be devout, but *not* overstrained”), asks Wittgenstein in his private notes. He is warning himself

again and again, knowing the snares of language: “Aber was ist am Gebrauch der Zeichen Tiefes? Da erinnere ich mich, erstens [...], daran, daß die Probleme, die durch ein Mißdeuten der Formen unserer Sprache entstehen immer den Charakter des Profunden haben”¹² (“But what profundity is there in the use of signs? I remember, first, [...] that the problems arising from a misinterpretation of the forms of our language always have the character of profundity.”) Repeatedly we are reminded that all of our conduct is linked with language or, better: language games. A good example is found in Wittgenstein’s remark of February 4, 1937:

I can well deny the Christian solution of the problem of life (redemption, resurrection, judgement, heaven, hell), but by this the problem of our life is not at all solved, for I am not good and not happy... And how can I know, what picture of the order of the world I would have in mind as the only acceptable one if I lived in a different way, in a completely different way. I cannot judge... If one lives in another way, one speaks in another way. With a new life one learns new language games.¹³

Thus we can learn new uses of language if we change our life and the principles of life, and this is also proof that we have changed the ways we think and feel. In the same year Wittgenstein offers another remark concerning the dogmas of our thinking and the power of literature – in this case religious literature – to influence people:

The effect of making men think in accordance with dogmas, perhaps in the form of certain graphic propositions will be very peculiar: I am not thinking of these dogmas as determining men’s opinions but rather as completely controlling the *expression* of all opinions. People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being able to say they are not free. I think the Catholic Church does something rather like this. For dogma is expressed in the form of an assertion, and is unshakable, but at the same time any practical opinion *can* be made to harmonize with it.¹⁴

III.

After his death, nearly fifty years ago, there is an almost general view (especially in publications in English) that Wittgenstein – who had, apart from one article, not published anything but the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* – was perhaps the most important philosopher of the twentieth century. That he belonged to the history of English philosophy seemed obvious. Started with his philosophical studies before the First World War in England with Russell, his training as a philosopher was English. And with a few exceptions – perhaps with several soldiers during the war (Ludwig Hänsel, Michael Drobil) and the members of his family – he did not belong to any circle in Vienna. I do not think he had much contact with artists and writers in Vienna. When he met Loos, whom he already knew personally in 1914, together with von Ficker, during the early 1920s, he was disgusted: he found him “*versmukt*.”

But this did not alter his high regard for Loos's revolutionary decision to liberate modern architecture from unnecessary decoration. The house that Wittgenstein designed for his sister, Gretl Stonborough, in Kundmanngasse in Vienna, originally designed by Paul Engelmann, was a task which in some way should have helped to overcome the fact and catastrophe that he had to quit his job as a teacher. On the other hand, it did give Wittgenstein the chance to practice and to prove his aesthetic sense and his abilities as an engineer. Together with Engelmann, whom he won as a friend during his time in Olmütz, he put all of his talent into the construction and details of this house, which reflects the ideas and constructions of Adolf Loos. That, on the other hand, he both did not at all like Loos's engagement in an almost political movement for new architecture *and* found him somewhat strange was, I think, *not* an obstacle to the inclusion of Loos's name in the list of people who had a decisive influence on his own thinking. At certain moments Wittgenstein was convinced that there was truth in his idea that he "really only think[s] reproductively." It is worthwhile quoting this confession from 1931:

I don't believe I have ever *invented* a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me [...] What I invent are new *similes*.¹⁵

Although I do not want to dwell on this list, I think that we have to take it seriously and that it in fact comprises the most important figures in Wittgenstein's intellectual life. It is noteworthy that this list, written almost three years after his return to England in 1931, includes only one Englishman – Russell – but four Germans: Heinrich Hertz, Arthur Schopenhauer, Gottlob Frege, and Oswald Spengler. Evidently not all philosophers, these Germans were, at different times, of central importance to the evolution of Wittgenstein's work. The list also reflects the temporal order of these influences, since of the five Austrians, he mentions Boltzmann first, followed by Kraus, Loos, and Weininger (whom he met before the twenties), and finally Sraffa (whom he met immediately after his return to England; actually Sraffa's name is emphasised especially in Wittgenstein's preface to his second main work, the *Philosophical Investigations*).

Unfortunately there does not exist a similar list of poets and writers who may have contributed to his understanding, even if they did possibly have a special role in his "work of classification" – his *Klärungswerk* as he has called it. But on the basis of different sources, I think he could have made similar lists for literature. Most of the following names would no doubt have been mentioned: of the writers and poets from Germany, first and foremost, is Goethe, who has a special place in Wittgenstein's life, and then Friedrich Schiller, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Heinrich von Kleist, Matthias Claudius, Eduard Mörike, Ludwig Uhland, Albert von Chamisso, Wilhelm Busch, and certainly Georg Christoph Lichtenberg; from Switzerland, Gottfried Keller, and from Austria, Franz Grillparzer, Johann Nestroy, Nikolaus Lenau, and Rainer Maria Rilke. But others should also be mentioned, for

instance, Ferdinand Kürnberger and Ludwig Anzengruber, Russian writers (especially Dostoevskii and Tolstoi), and the famous Indian Rabindranath Tagore.

Wittgenstein was for some time a regular reader of *Der Brenner*, edited by Ludwig von Ficker, and even before the First World War a temporary subscriber to the journal *Die Fackel*, edited by Karl Kraus. The first journal was indeed a more or less Catholic literary journal. Nevertheless, or perhaps just because of this fact, one could find there poems by Georg Trakl and Rainer Maria Rilke. That even Karl Kraus praised this journal as “the only honest periodical in Austria,” and hence the only honest periodical in Germany,¹⁶ persuaded Wittgenstein to donate to this journal 100,000 Kronen (at that time quite an enormous amount of money), of which Trakl and Rilke were to receive 20,000 Kronen each; 10,000 Kronen went to the journal *Der Brenner*, and the balance was distributed among fourteen other people.

It was through these transactions that Wittgenstein received Georg Trakl’s poems, which he evaluated as brilliant, in spite of the fact that he could not understand them.¹⁷ Actually, in November 1914, Wittgenstein wanted to visit Trakl, who was at the time ill and in a Krakow hospital. But Trakl, who had previously attempted suicide, died after a final attempt two days before Wittgenstein’s ship “Goplana” arrived in Krakow. In his diary Wittgenstein notes: “Ich bin gespannt, ob ich Trakl treffen werde. Ich hoffe sehr.” (“I am curious whether I shall meet Trakl. I very much hope so.”) Receiving the sad news in the hospital, he writes: “Dies traf mich sehr stark. Wie traurig, wie traurig.” (“This affected me very strongly. How sad, how sad.”) In a letter to Ludwig von Ficker he repeats what he thought of Trakl’s poems: “Ich verstehe sie nicht; aber ihr *Ton* beglückt mich. Es ist der Ton der wahrhaft genialen Menschen.”¹⁸ (“I do not understand them; but their *tone* makes me happy. It is the tone of truly ingenious people.”)

We know for a fact that Wittgenstein was well acquainted with at least these two journals, *Die Fackel* and *Der Brenner*, which means that at a certain time he had a general picture of the kinds of lyric and prose writings available and an idea of what modern literature, at least German modern literature, was about. If, however, we turn our attention to the oft-mentioned examples of the kinds of literature Wittgenstein actually liked and read, we will mainly have to look the past; most of his citations and remarks point in that direction. There is no doubt Wittgenstein had quite a good and perhaps even excellent knowledge of classical literature. Whenever possible he read a text in its original language; he even worked on his Latin in order to read the *Vulgata* in the appropriate language.

IV.

Wright, in his aforementioned papers, calls our attention to three authors, all of whom have dedicated their work to the question: what kind of relation or correspondence is there – or can there be found – between Wittgenstein and his philosophy on the one hand and modernity on the other. The three authors are Allan Janik,¹⁹ co-author with Stephen Toulmin of *Wittgenstein’s Vienna*; Janos Christof

Nyíri, the Hungarian philosopher who ascribes to Wittgenstein not only a conservative style but also a conservative anthropology;²⁰ and S. Stephan Hilmy, with his studies on the later Wittgenstein.²¹ I will not discuss any of these except for a very brief observation on Nyíri's view of Wittgenstein's conservatism and a remark on Hilmy's attempt to stress – or overestimate – the difference between the early and the later Wittgenstein.

No one reading Wittgenstein's writings, and especially the remarks to be found in his notes and letters concerning his relation to his time, can fail to observe that a number of these remarks can be read and understood as expressions of a traditionalist or, in Nyíri's view, conservative way of thinking. Nyíri claims that neo-conservative thinkers directly influenced these remarks and, especially, Wittgenstein's later philosophy.²² Perhaps the best examples cited by Nyíri are the writings of Paul Ernst; Wittgenstein admired this writer and poet, and even wanted to mention Ernst in the preface of a book. "The book" Wittgenstein was alluding to is probably the one he hoped to finish and for which he wrote the preface in November 1930. Nevertheless it seems to me completely wrong to mix up, on the one side, the change of one's life and lifestyle (as motivated by religious and ethical reasons), and, on the other, Wittgenstein's conservative taste and interest in music and poetry with a general neo-conservative political movement. A few characteristic traits of some kind do not make up an ideal; we have to take into account the overall circumstances from which these traits arise. For instance, Mahler's symphonies exemplify a remarkably different type compared to classical symphonies. Wittgenstein believed that Mahler's music was "worthless," but despite this negative judgment, he recognized that "if conditions nowadays are really so different from what they once were that one cannot even compare the *genre* one's work belongs to with that of earlier works, then one can not compare them in respect to the *value* of either."²³ And Wittgenstein adds that he, too, makes this mistake now and then.

It is in this sense that Wright justly criticizes Nyíri's identification of Wittgenstein's criticism of modern civilisation with conservatism; Wright is also justified in correcting Janik's proposal to discern in Wittgenstein's life a strict separation between his philosophy and his personal beliefs. After all, what would it mean to separate philosophizing from personal beliefs? Can we even think of this as anything other than a form of insincerity? No, what Wittgenstein does not say, we, on our part, should not imagine that he had said or thought it, except when there is sufficient evidence. In any case, I do not think that Janik actually suggested what Wright rightly does criticize. What Janik might have found in the later writings of Wittgenstein – and perhaps this is the point he wanted to stress – was the remarkable advice Wittgenstein had for himself and his readers, to be unbiased and not take sides in philosophy: philosophy leaves everything as it is. I shall return to this point later.

With regard to Hilmy's thesis that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is in essence a strong departure from his earlier philosophy, I share Wright's doubts; he correctly emphasizes the unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his lifelong battle for the proper understanding of philosophy and its task. However, my criticism of Hilmy is not limited to disagreeing with his perception of two different

Wittgensteins, which one may call Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II. I am contesting Hilmy's picture of the later Wittgenstein as such. This does not mean that I am not in agreement with many or most of the results of Hilmy's research concerning the earlier sources of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, which, to a remarkable degree, can be found in the unpublished so-called *Big Typescript* (TS 213). I think, for instance, that Hilmy provided good evidence that this typescript has a "far stronger claim to the title 'Preliminary Study for the *Philosophical Investigations*' than *The Brown Books* has."²⁴

With his general tendency to exaggerate the difference between the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and his later philosophy, Hilmy does not merely repeat a mistake that marked the early reception of Wittgenstein's work. The trouble is that Hilmy's analysis rests on the erroneous belief that the later Wittgenstein was in total disagreement with his writings of the earlier *Tractatus* period, and equally in total conflict with the logical empiricists. One remembers one of the preface-versions of the "book" Wittgenstein wrote and wanted to publish in the early thirties. In the early version from 1930, he emphasized the huge difference in spirit between the main current of European and American civilisation, "whose expression is the industry, architecture, music, fascism and socialism of our time" and his own anti-modernistic attitude. During the period in which he wrote these versions of the preface, he was deeply influenced by Spengler. While Spengler saw the decline of the West as the fate of Europe, Wittgenstein, unlike Spengler, included also the United States in the decline, although, in agreement with Spengler, he excluded Russia. This general aversion to the political, social, and cultural situation in Europe was not at all unique and was particularly common in Austria. Robert Musil, for instance, notes in his diary that "Europe has never been at such a low ebb as now."²⁵ And, reflecting on why this is the case, Musil attempts initially to think of man as an "*Ungestalt*," something that accommodates to a given form, but does not shape or construct it. In the same context Musil says: "The human being does not fix the shape of his own life [...]. The causal chains of human development and those of the particular life-form are different."²⁶

Wittgenstein may have had similar thoughts about *Lebensform* as early as Musil did – namely at the time of the publication of the *Tractatus*, although I have not find any trace of them. In the 1920s Wittgenstein assessed the mood of the people around him as he had during the final years of the First World War: "We are asleep... *Our* life is like a dream."²⁷ And disgusted by his impression of some Austrians in Lower Austria, he said that the people were not human at all but loathsome worms. Thus, already in 1922, he mentions "the idea of a possible flight to Russia," to, as we might guess, the Russia of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, the Russia beyond Western civilisation.²⁸ Even when in 1935 Wittgenstein actually went to Russia it was – besides other aims and considerations – in the hope of escaping the strange demands life, namely normal life, makes. And he knew that if "your life does not fit into life's mould," you have to change it so that "it does fit into the mould" – the German word Wittgenstein used was *Form*. To fit into a mould, or life-form, seems to be an image

for a complicated process, and we do not know general criteria for fitting into a life-form because there always remain more options and possibilities beyond the ones which have actually come true or been realized. One might think that the difference between the happy man and the unhappy man does reflect the fitting or non-fitting. But this is not something we can achieve by our will. Wittgenstein never gave up the thought that the world is independent of the will: “Even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favour of fate,” he says in the *Tractatus* (6.374). Since there are only logical necessities, no other connection of this kind can be made. The rules we follow in our life are in an essential sense arbitrary. They “are arbitrary in the sense that they are not responsible to some sort of reality – they are not similar to natural laws; nor are they responsible to some meaning the word already has.”²⁹

V.

Concerning the unity of his work – if this claim has any justification – I assume and take it as a fact that Austrian literature and Austrian philosophy have taken on a shape of their own. But I am aware it would be an exaggeration to state that its literature should be as rigorously distinguished from German literature as Austrian philosophy is from philosophy in Germany. And that has nothing to do with the fact that Kant’s and the German idealists’ philosophy did not have the same effect in Austria as in Germany. On the contrary, the philosophies of Bolzano and Brentano represent the two lines of the Austrian tradition responsible for the fact that Austrian philosophy has been taken seriously in the last 150 years.

I want to emphasize that: there is, as far as I can see, no indication that Wittgenstein was prejudiced against German literature, but he must have seen a general difference, which in 1929 he formulated as follows: “I think good Austrian work (Grillparzer, Lenau, Bruckner, Labor) is particularly hard to understand. There is a sense in which it is *subtler* than anything else and the truth it expresses never leans towards plausibility.”³⁰

The problem at the center of Wittgenstein’s work was not so much the mind but language: language, he stated, is a labyrinth. You come from one side, and you know where you are (“und du kennst dich aus”); you come from another side to the same spot, and you are lost (“und kennst dich nicht mehr aus”). This is why he directed his interests towards Austrian writers and critics, to Ferdinand Kürnberger and Johann Nestroy: from these two writers he borrowed his mottoes for the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as well as for the *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein was also deeply impressed by a play of another Austrian poet and playwright, Ludwig Anzengruber, which engendered in him a religious feeling he never could forget. He later told his friends that this experience occurred when he was twenty-one; he saw the play *Der Kreuzelschreiber* (published 1873), in which “one of the characters expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the world, nothing bad could happen to *him* – *he* was independent of fate and circumstances.”³¹ “Es kann Dir nix g’schehn! – Du g’hörst zu dem all’n und dös

alles g'hört zu Dir! Es kann Dir nix g'schehn!"³² ("Nothing can happen to you! – You are part of all this, and all this is part of you! Nothing can happen to you!"): this passage in the play impressed Wittgenstein immensely, and he referred to it repeatedly when explaining his religious feelings.

In spite of the fact that in some respects Wittgenstein was a leading modern philosopher and writer, he still remained, from another perspective, critical of modernity: his favorite period in the history of culture ended, as he himself confessed, with the time of Schumann. Thus we may ask ourselves: Why Wittgenstein failed to notice or actually ignored even those artists and writers who, during his lifetime, shared his general background and some of his ethical and moral points of view? Why did he think that "*his* house," although he had been asked to cooperate in its design by the architect Paul Engelmann, did not meet his requirements? Was the house not an example of modern architecture?

We do not find anything in his writings that we could compare to modern literature, nor do we find examples of modern literature in his reading list. Even in the case of Trakl, with whom he had some emotional relationship, does not point to a case of literature which could have served Wittgenstein as a true sample and which he himself did accept. The simplicity he could and did admire in the poems of Mörike was one of the examples of finding the simplest answer in the middle of philosophical questions. Whereas Wittgenstein had always been interested in contemporary music, and in Gustav Mahler in particular, the works of the poets of that time did not seem to interest him as strongly. But as it is rather unlikely that he did not at least try to feel the spirit of poetry of his time, that is early twentieth century poetry, one can only assume that it must have remained strange to Wittgenstein.

¹ Reprinted in: *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays*, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993.

² Friedrich A. von Hayek, *The Counterrevolution of Science*, Glenco, IL: The Free Press, 1952.

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die Unschuld des Werdens. Der Nachlaß. Bd. I*, ed. Alfred Bäuml, Leipzig: A. Kröner, 1931, p. 391f.

⁴ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Cambridge Letters*, ed. Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 140. Concerning Tolstoi's influence on Wittgenstein, see Brian McGuinness, *Wittgenstein: A Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 156f.

⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p. 39e.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39e.

⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Geheime Tagebücher 1914-16*, Vienna: Turia and Kant, 1991, p. 68.

- ⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Cambridge Letters*, ed. Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright (Letter of Russell to Lady Ottoline, Dec. 20, 1919), p. 140.
- ⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Denkbewegungen. Tagebücher 1930-1932, 1936-1937 (MS 183)*, Part 1, ed. Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck: Haymon, 1997, p. 86 (Feb. 20, 1937).
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86 (Feb. 20, 1937).
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.
- ¹⁴ Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 28e [see endnote 5].
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19e.
- ¹⁶ Quoted in McGuinness, *Wittgenstein: A Life*, p. 205 [see endnote 4].
- ¹⁷ As Wittgenstein confessed in his diary (Nov. 24, 1914).
- ¹⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Briefe an Ludwig v. Ficker*, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright, Salzburg: Otto Müller, p. 22.
- ¹⁹ Allan Janik, *Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger* (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie IX), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1985. Allan Janik, "Why Is Wittgenstein Important?" in: *Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation*, ed. Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium), Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990, vol. 2, pp. 240-246.
- ²⁰ Janos Christof Nyíri, ed., *Austrian Philosophy: Studies and Texts*, Munich, 1981; J.C. Nyíri, *Gefühl und Gefüge: Studien zum Entstehen der Philosophie Wittgensteins* (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie XI), Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986; J.C. Nyíri, *Am Rande Europas: Studien zur österreichisch-ungarischen Philosophiegeschichte*. Ch. IV: "Konservative Anthropologie: Der Sohn Wittgenstein," Vienna: Böhlau, 1988, pp. 91-155.
- ²¹ S. Stephan Hilmy, *The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
- ²² Nyíri, *Am Rande Europas*, p. 113.
- ²³ Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 67e (remark from 1948) [see endnote 5].
- ²⁴ See Hilmy, *The Later Wittgenstein*, p. 37.
- ²⁵ Robert Musil, *Diaries 1899-1941*, ed. Mark Mirsky, New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 266.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 541.
- ²⁷ Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein. With a Memoir*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, p. 7 (Letter from April 9, 1917).
- ²⁸ Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein*, p. 52 (Letter from Sept. 14, 1922).
- ²⁹ Alice Ambrose, ed., *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 4.
- ³⁰ Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 3e.
- ³¹ Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*. Second edition, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984, p. 58.
- ³² Ludwig Anzengruber, *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vienna: Kremer & Scheriau, 1966, p. 172.